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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Respondent's brief makes certain allegations and
representations which are simply untrue and therefore call
for a response.

In addition, Appellant believes that the

recent decision of this Court in the case of L.A. Young
Sons Construction Co. v. County of Tooele, et al., 575
P.2d 1034 (1978), is dispositive of this case.
This brief is therefore deemed necessary but will
be limited in scope.
POINT I
RESPONDENT'. S ASSERTIONS REGARDING REPRESENTATIONS BY VIRGIL MITCHELL ARE NOT
SUPPORTABLE EITHER FACTUALLY OR LEGALLY
AND THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS REGARDING SAME
ARE ERRONEOUS.
In its brief on pages 15 and 16 the Respondent
alleges that "witnesses for Thorn

testified that Mr.

Mitchell represented that material from the Utelite Pit
was available and could be used as borrow on the project."
Respondent then cites pages 38-39; 55-56 of the record as
support for this allegation.

Appellant's counsel has ex-

amined these two references and there is absolutely no
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reference on the four cited pages to any statement
by Virgil Mitchell concerning anything, let alone the
borrow source in question.
The fact is, no witness in this trial ever
testified that Mr. Mitchell said anything more than that
the Utelite Pit was a "possible

source.~

In fact, these

words are the exact words used by Respondent's chief witness on this point, Grant Thorn, during his direct testimony.

(R. 8, 9)

On cross-examination, he again used

the term "possible source of borrow"

(R. 12).

He also stated in response to a question on
cross-examination about the material as follows:
Question: In your conversations with
Mr. Mitchell did you ask him whether the
material had been tested?
Answer: No, we assumed that it had.
(Emphasis supplied.) (R. 11)
Obviously, if the trial Court concluded that Mr.
Mitchell made a "positive representation" to Thorn regar~
ing the Utelite material as Respondent alleges on page 17
of its brief, the Court's conclusion is not supported by
the facts in evidence.
Legally, the Respondent cites the case of ~
Morrill Co. v. State of California, 59 Cal.Rpt>_-. 479, 42 3
P.2d 551 (1967) as authority for its position that Appellant is liable to Respondent for the alleged representatior
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of Appellant's employee Mitchell.
There are two problems with Respondent's
reliance on Morrill.

The first is that there was no

"positive" representation by Appellant's employee
Mitchell as already explained hereinabove.

The second

problem is that the Morrill case is not applicable to
the situation we have here.

The recent case of L.A.

Young Sons Construction Company v. County of Tooele,
et al., supra, is, however, directly applicable to this
case.

In that case the Court said the following at

page 1039:
. . • Plaintiff's entire claim reduced
to its basic elements is that defendant should
bear responsibility for any condition which
plaintiff did not subjectively anticipate and
that defendant had a duty to assure that the
conditions at the project site reached all of
plaintiff's optimistic expectations. This
theory is contrary to all the aforecited law.
This Court in the Young case, supra, also relied on
Wunderlich v. State of California, 65 Cal.2d 777, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 473, 423 P.2d 545 (1967).

In said case it is stated

as follows at page 550:
• . • Defendant had no knowledge of any
impediments to performance an~ ~ad made no
misrepresentations as to cond~tions. To hold
defendant liable under such circumstances would
cast upon it responsibility for all conditions
a contractor might encounter and ~ake that cost
of the project an unknown quantity.
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From the facts and the foregoing legal author-

ities it is obvious that as stated by Grant Thorn, they
assumed that the Utelite source was a suitable source.

It is submitted that this assumption arose not from any
representation or misrepresentation by Appellant's employee Virgil Mitchell, but from their own assumptions
about the Utelite source and its suitability.
In the words of the L.A. Young case at page 10
. . if statements honestly made may
be suggestive only, expenses caused by unforeseen conditions will be placed on the
contractor, especially if the contract so
stipulates . . . .
The trial Court's conclusion that Respondent
was entitled to recover for alleged misrepresentations
by Virgil Mitchell is obviously in error.
Likewise, the Court's conclusion that language
in Sections 102.05 and 106.02 of the Standard Specifica
tions which requires the contractor to examine the construction site and determine the availability of materi
does not apply is clearly wrong as is apparent from a
reading of the L.A. Young case, supra.
POINT II
RESPONDENT'S ANALYSIS OF THE PARSON CASE IS
INCORRECT AND SAID CASE IS CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THIS CASE.
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In its First Point on Appeal, Respondent
goes into an involved argument regarding the case of
Jack B. Parson Construction Company v. State of Utah,
552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976).
While Appellant does not necessarily disagree
with the quoted portions of that opinion set forth in
Respondent's brief, Appellant does not agree that said
case is in any way controlling on the issues of this
case.
On page 11 of its brief, Respondent asserts that
"Thorn attempted to negotiate a supplemental agreement."
The record does not show that Respondent made a serious
effort to negotiate a supplemental agreement at any time
during the project.

The record does show that Respondent

refused to provide cost data as requested by Appellant.
The record further shows that Respondent's so-called attempt to "negotiate" was a claim based on a total cost
approach using rental rates obviously not related to Respondent's actual costs.

This approach, if accepted,

would simply indemnify Respondent for its entire costs
regardless of whether these costs were necessary or
whether the work was accomplished in an economical f ashion.
Appellant submits that Section 104.02 of the
Standard specifications and particularly subsection 2 is
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intended to protect the contractor in the event an
item underruns in excess of 25%.

It is further obvious

from the language of the specification that profit on
the portion of the item which underruns is not to be
considered.

It is further obvious that the first 25%

of the alteration in quantity is not to be considered.
The specification says " .

. In the event of a de-

crease, any adjustments in payment shall apply to the
quantity or quantities of work actually performed."
Appellant submits that this does not give carte blanche
authority to turn a bid which may have been erroneous or
insufficient into a profit making item.
In the instant case the Respondent bid $1.20
per ton.

His projected costs for loading, hauling, plK-

ing and compacting the material was $0.95.

No matter

what approach is used to deal with the quantity that the
item underruns

can

justify payment of any portion of

this amount to Respondent.

These operations are all

direct charges which he did not incur as a result of a
reduction in the item.

They represent such items as

labor, fuel and equipment charges which he did not incur.
In round figures the estimated quantity of the item was
28,000 cubic yards.
yards.

A 25% underrun would be 7,000 cub~

The actual used quantity was 15,000 cubic yards.
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The underrun quantity was 6,000 cubic yards.

The Ap-

pellant's interpretation of the specification is that
to the extent of said excess underrun of 6,000 cubic
yards the Respondent should recover anything it would
otherwise realize had the item not underrun.

Since

the $0.95 direct charges would not benefit Respondent,
he should recover the balance of the price of the item
over and above the direct charges less profit which is
specifically excluded from the computation.
It is conceivable that the item actually costs
the Respondent more than his bid price.

This of ten re-

sults from miscalculation or in some instances results
from what is called an "unbalanced bid."

This means the

contractor reduces his calculated price by a certain
amount and adds it to another bid item such as "mobilization" or some item which is paid at an earlier point in
the contract.
If Respondent's figures as to its actual costs
are correct, then it would appear that Respondent made
a "bad bid" or has "unbalanced" its bid.

In either

event, Appellant submits that its responsibility under
the contract specification ends at the point Respondent
recovers its bid price less direct costs and profit on
the 6,000 yards underrun in quantity, which Appellant
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asserted previously in its brief amounts to $1,791.30.
To award anything over and above said amount results
in a windfall to Respondent.
Appellant submits that the Parson case, supra,
deals with an overall underrun in the total contract
and not just one "major item" as we have in this situation.·
The two cases do not equate.
For these reasons Appellant submits that the
award by the trial Court is excessive to the extent that
it allows Respondent relief for an underrun in the quantity of "granular borrow" in excess of $1,791.30.
POINT III
RECENT DECISIONS SUPPORT ARGUMENTS URGED
IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF UNDER POINT II.
In Point II of Appellant's brief, the Appellant
has argued that Respondent's failure to timely notify Ap·
pellant of its intention to file a claim for additional
compensation as required by the contract specifications
is a waiver of any right to recover for the i terns claimed.
The Tennessee Court has recently construed a
similar provision in the case of W & 0 Construction Co.,
Inc. v. City ~f Smithville, 557 S.W.2d 920 (1977).

In

that case a contractor brought suit against a municipali~
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to recover extra costs incurred in rock removal while
constructing a wastewater treatment plant.

The Supreme

Court held that such recovery was barred where the contractor failed to comply wi'th
·
. the con t rac t ua 1 requirement
that it obtain a written change order to obtain extra
compensation.

Furthermore, the Court found no facts

showing a waiver, modification, or abrogation of that
express contractual requirement.
This failure to give timely notice was also
held to deny compensation in Pennsylvania in the case of
Central Penn. Industries, Inc. v. Penn DOT, 358 A.2d 445,
(1976).
case.

This case is somewhat similar to the instant
In this case the contractor was required under the

contract to obtain granular material to complete the top
of the project's embankments.

After performing almost

no investigation to locate such material on the project
site, the contractor went to off-site borrow pits to locate
the material.

They then sought to recover the additional

expense from the commonwealth.

The contractor was awarded

the costs by the Board of Arbitration of Claims, the evidence, ignored by the board, however, showed that the contractor made no mention of a claim until four years after
it secured the borrow excavation.

The Commonwealth Court

noted that the proper ten-day written notice was not given
and reversed the decision of the board.
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Needless to say, the trial Court in the
instant case has ignored the required notice provisions of Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the relief requested
previously in its brief is appropriate and submits that
the Respondent has not refuted those arguments in its
brief.

Appellant further submits that Respondent has

attempted to confuse and mislead the Court as to the
actual state of the record regarding the testimony concerning alleged representations involving a materials
source by Appellant's employee Virgil Mitchell.

Finally,

Appellant respectfully urges the Court to reverse the
ruling of the District Court and award judgment against
Appellant for $1,791.30 or alternatively for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

--:,4

ROBERT B. HANSEN, Attorney General
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